. W hile governing may be merely a by-product o f the electoral objective, it can contribute to the achievement o f that objective. According to democratic theory, those that govern successfully will be rewarded with re-election. Therefore, one would expect the majority party to use its position to prohibit the minority party from gaining the legislative successes that might contribute to electoral successes (M oore and Thomas 1991; Meyer 1980). This is particularly likely when that minority party is an electoral threat to majority status.
important for the members of the minority party than for their majority colleagues. In a setting where institutional power of the minority is limited, the only hope for institutional success is the power of unity of the minority (Jones 1970) .
The Im portance of Interparty Competition In the Legislature While Schlesinger's theory revolves around the significance of competi tion for individual offices, he acknowledges the importance of collective or corporate competition in determining the level of activity of the parties (1985, . The significance of institutional competition cannot be overestimated in determining variations in the activities of different minority parties (Jewell 1962; Gierzynski 1992, 78; Jewell 1992, 27) . No party has the resources to be successful, or even competitive, in campaigns for all offices. Centers of electoral party activists (nuclei) "will emerge in those constituencies where the party has some short-or long-run chance of win ning the office" (Schlesinger 1985 (Schlesinger , 1154 . While at least skeletal minority party organizations are likely to exist in all legislatures, they will be of electoral significance only in those institutions offering a realistic oppor tunity for gaining majority status.
Institutional competition affects not only the level of effort expended on elections and the degree of attention paid to the electorate, but also the success and behavior of individual legislators. Where party competition is great, we can expect a great gulf between the success of majority and minor ity members. This is because legislative success may lead to electoral success and that is a risk the majority party should be unwilling to take. However, it is likely that such a gulf will disappear in institutions where competition is lower.2 Further, in a competitive institution both parties will be well organized and strive to achieve cohesiveness. In less competitive institutions, neither party will make serious attempts to enforce cohesive ness. In other words, parties will work the hardest and be the most partisan when the chances of victory and political rewards are the highest.
In summary, Schlesinger's theory offers several suggestions regarding the attitudes, influence and behavior of the legislative minority party in relation to its institutional partisan context. The following three hypotheses will be examined below:
H I: The attention of the legislative minority party to external and electoral matters, as well as the propensity to aggressively challenge incumbents of the other party is positively related to the level of interparty compe tition within that institution. 
H2: The individual-level advantage o f majority status is inversely related

Senates in Five States
In order to test the implications o f Schlesinger's theory on legislative minority parties in different electoral environments, the minority parties in five institutions o f relatively similar structure and size, but various levels o f partisan competition, will be examined. W e will look at the senate minority parties o f Maryland, North Carolina, Delaware, Virginia and Ohio. Key characteristics o f these five institutions are offered in Table 1 In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, data were gathered from several sources in each of the states. Two measures were used to determine the degree of attention that the minority parties placed on external and electoral activities, one based on the nature of expected leadership behavior and the second on actual behavior. First, leaders and members of the minor ity party were queried7 as to the appropriate activities for their legislative 
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Source: Based on interviews with members speaker, the general public, and campaign activities comprise less than a third of the party activities in these two "one party predominant" states. More significantly, campaign related activities comprise less than five percent of the anticipated party activities reported by minority members. These parties are in the minority and expect the party organization to do little to change that status. As the parties move toward parity, there is a noticeable shift in the direction of expectations related to external activities in general and campaign activities in particular. About forty percent of the responses associated with minority leadership in Delaware relate to external activities and over a third of those external activities are campaign related. In addition to coordinating party activities and working with the majority, the leaders of the minority party in Delaware are expected to be cognizant of the coming elections. In Virginia, where the minority has shown the greatest gains in recent years, members look to the party organization to continue Finally, the two most competitive minority parties, Virginia Republi cans and Ohio Democrats, were extremely active. In addition to providing seminars and recruiting candidates, both parties contributed substantial amounts o f money and services. Interviews with leaders reveal a conscious effort to target competitive races, which is supported by the data in Table  2 . Over 80 percent o f the money distributed by Virginia Republicans went to competitive races. Further, Virginia leaders indicated a willingness to challenge incumbent Democrats (71% o f the money went to challenge in cumbent Democrats), as evidenced by the distribution o f resources. In fact, they gave no money to incumbent members and the caucus showed a great willingness to challenge incumbent Democrats. Likewise, only four percent o f the money distributed by Ohio Democrats went to incumbents. The decid ing factor for distribution in these two states was, as expected, winnability and need, not incumbency. Also, over half o f the money distributed here went to competitive seats, although less than a quarter o f all races were competitive. Given the high cost o f victory in Virginia ($81,510) and Ohio ($118,898), it is not surprising that these parties spent a great deal of money. In attitude and action, minority parties in competitive states make a calculated and well funded effort directed toward achieving majority status, while their counterparts in less competitive positions (with the noted exception o f some targeting efforts in Maryland) make a token effort, at best.
To the Victor Go the Spoils
Schlesinger argues that the persons within a party that have electoral victories will possess influence. The logic applies to the corporate party as w ell, with the winners (majority party members) expected to have greater influence. This should be particularly true in parties where the minority party is large enough to be considered an electoral threat. 
Organized and Cohesive Parties
The third implication o f Schlesinger's definition o f political parties concerns the organization and behavior o f the parties within the institution. It is argued that parties in competitive situations will organize themselves in a manner that will enable the party to attain collective goods and help indi vidual members achieve personal objectives (Schlesinger 1985 (Schlesinger , 1154 . The result of this increased organization should be a stronger party presence as reflected in increased party voting.
The data presented in Table 4 represent the nature of the formal legis lative party organization as described by members of the party. It is quite clear that the party organizations are more complex in states with competi tive parties. The Maryland Republican Caucus, which meets as a caucus only once each session (to elect its leader), elects a floor leader who appoints a whip. In conjunction with the House floor leader, the Minority Leader oversees the distribution of limited campaign funds. The party has no formal staff. In a similar manner, North Carolina Republican senators elect three leaders, one of whom oversees the distribution of a small chest of funds to candidates. The party caucus has no staff and meets irregularly, generally to gather information from members of the Republican adminis tration, rather than to develop policy positions. The six member Delaware Republican Caucus elects only a floor leader who then selects a whip. Interestingly, there appears to be no relationship between the number of leadership positions and the salary associated with leadership responsi bilities. Table 4 indicates that the two most complex organizations differ greatly in compensation. Virginia Republican leaders receive no financial benefits from their service, while all four Ohio Democrats had a financial incentive to serve. As suggested by Schlesinger, parties in more competitive situations are more inclined to build a complex organization that will allow them to govern as well as win election s.11 Further, it is only as the party becomes competitive that the senate party is organized as an independent and significant "nucleus" with its own campaign arm rather than merely an arm o f the bicameral "legislative party." While Schlesinger's approach implies that personal goals comprise the primary objectives o f modern political parties, he notes that members o f parties in competitive situations should be most likely to work together to produce collective goods. Interparty electoral competition is likely to breed intraparty policy cooperation (1985, 1155). Table 5 nature, while more than two-thirds could be defined as such in Ohio. About half of the competitive votes in North Carolina, Delaware and Virginia were partisan in nature, but minority members stuck together on about 75 percent of those votes. The standard deviation measures reveal that not only do minority mem bers in competitive institutions tend to have higher average party loyalty, but they are less likely to have outliers that skew the average scores in one direction or the other. Their unity is a reflection of common vote patterns across the caucus rather than a few members that are very loyal. With the exception of the Delaware Republicans, the deviation in party voting decreases as competition increases. The average Ohio Democrat varied from the 92.7 percent score by just over two percent, while the seven Maryland Republicans varied by over 20 percent in their limited support. As competi tion increases, legislative parties do act more like governing parties as Schlesinger predicts.
Conclusion
In presenting his market-based theory of political parties, Joseph A. Schlesinger defines competition primarily in terms of individual elections. Parties focus their attention on individual elections that are significant and winnable. This theory is particularly pertinent for minority parties because electoral success is a precondition for policy success. This study indicates that the attitudes, success, organization and behavior of minority political parties are not only a function of individual electoral environments, but are also responsive to the corporate electoral environment of the party. The implications o f these findings are significant for those who study politics as well as casual observers. First, it is impossible to understand any political phenomenon without understanding the context in which it exists. We can only fully understand the nature o f political parties and legislative parties if w e understand the situation from which they draw their shape, power and influence. Second, w e should not merely ignore minority parties in the legislature or elsewhere assuming they are inconsequential. Indeed, they might be quite important in their ability to either influence policy directly (in less competitive institutions) or force the majority to take particular positions to defend its majority status (in competitive institutions). As parties in the state legislatures become more competitive, scholars, politicians and casual observers should be aware of the consequences on the politics and policies of the institution.
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1The level of interparty competition as a predictor of legislative behavior and organization is well documented by other scholars as well (Jewell 1955; Jewell 1962; Hamm and Hedlund 1994) .
2While studies indicate that the success and activity of legislative parties will become more partisan as interparty competition increases (Little and Patterson 1993) , there is little evidence that they will automatically lose that partisan desire as they lose those seats.
3While one might define the electoral strength of a legislative party in terms of the percentage of the vote received in each individual race, I will rely on the more traditional measure based on the proportion of seats held, as well as some indication of the electoral trend.
4The 1994 Republican landslide resulted in an unprecedented 15 Republican mem bers. However, even following such a "landslide," they make up less than a third of the membership. 5Recent elections support the proposition that Republicans were on the rise. The 1994 election saw them move within a single seat of majority status . 6Also, Ohio is in a region where strong partisanship is more the norm than the traditionally one-party Virginia. This would also support the placement of Ohio as more competitive.
7Efforts were made to interview all minority party members. Open format inter views were conducted with all minority members in Maryland (7), North Carolina (13), and Delaware (6). Interviews were completed with all but two minority members in Ohio (13) and all but five in Virginia (13). As part of a general survey on legislative leader ship and legislative life, respondents were asked to describe the appropriate activities for each of the elected and appointed party leaders and to suggest any improvements.
8Internal activities include those that contribute primarily to the performance of partisan or institutional activities within the legislative body. Noncampaign external activities relate to those activities targeted at external actors (i.e., the governor, the speaker), but not primarily electoral in nature. Campaign activities are defined as those activities most directly related to the legislative campaigns, such as raising and distribu ting money, providing polling, speaking on behalf of the membership and monitoring in stitutional campaign staff. These activities are explored more thoroughly in Little (1995) .
9The proportion of bills passed with the member as primary sponsor was rejected as a measure because of the number of members that were the primary sponsor of no legislation.
10Obviously, the use o f floor passage rates as a measure o f legislative effectiveness is problematic and ignores other aspects o f the legislative process, such as constituency work and committee work. The importance o f these activities is not disputed. It simply is not the focus o f this study. Further, this "batting average" is widely used and is most comparable across institutions. Given the comparative nature o f this research, it was deemed the most feasible and appropriate measure.
11While there is some correlation between the number o f members in the minority caucus and the total number o f leaders, the monotonie increase in staff support as competition increases supports the importance o f competition as a driving force.
12Competitive votes are defined as those in which at least 10 percent o f the mem bers voted in the minority. The party success rate is the proportion o f times that the average member supported the party on competitive votes.
